Securitization and moral hazard: evidence from a lender cutoff rule
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Cited by:
- Anthony Yezer & Pingkang Yu, 2016. "Costly Screening, Self-Selection, Fraud, and the Organization of Credit Markets," Working Papers 2016-4, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
- Luojia Hu & Xing Huang & Andrei Simonov, 2020.
"Credit Score Doctors,"
Working Paper Series
WP 2020-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Luojia Hu & Xing Huang & Andrei Simonov, 2020. "Credit Score Doctors," Working Paper Series WP-2020-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013.
"Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization," NBER Working Papers 15159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2009-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages?: redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," Public Policy Discussion Paper 09-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Jin, Yu, 2012. "Essays on financial institutions and instability," ISU General Staff Papers 201201010800003361, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Alex Kaufman, 2014. "The Influence of Fannie and Freddie on Mortgage Loan Terms," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 472-496, June.
- Vogl, Tom S., 2014. "Race and the politics of close elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-113.
- Capozza, Dennis R. & Order, Robert Van, 2011. "The great surge in mortgage defaults 2006-2009: The comparative roles of economic conditions, underwriting and moral hazard," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 141-151, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mortgage-backed securities; Mortgage loans; Credit scoring systems;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2009-11-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2009-11-21 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-URE-2009-11-21 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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