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Decentralized production and public liquidity with private information

Author

Listed:
  • David C. Nachman
  • Stephen D. Smith

Abstract

Firms with private information about the outcomes of production under uncertainty may face capital (liquidity) constraints that prevent them from attaining efficient levels of investment in a world with costly and/or imperfect monitoring. As an alternative, we examine the efficiency of a simple pooling scheme designed to provide a public (cooperative) supply of liquidity that results in the first best outcome for economic growth. We show that if, absent aggregate uncertainty, the elasticity of scale of the production technology is sufficiently small, then efficient levels of investment and growth can always be supported. Finally, some results for a special case (constant elasticity of scale) are examined when investors face aggregate uncertainty. We show that, in addition to a low elasticity of scale for the production function, investors must have sufficiently optimistic prior beliefs if efficient growth is to be achieved regardless of the actual future state of the world.

Suggested Citation

  • David C. Nachman & Stephen D. Smith, 2000. "Decentralized production and public liquidity with private information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2000-2
    as

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    File URL: https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/wp/2000/wp0002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1997. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 523-546, June.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    3. Mirrlees, James A, 1997. "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1311-1329, September.
    4. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Keywords

    Information theory; Liquidity (Economics); Production (Economic theory);
    All these keywords.

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