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Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Author

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  • Dominik Karos

    (Department of Economics and Statistics, Saarland University)

Abstract

The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominik Karos, 2012. "Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games," Working Papers 2012.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.38
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Montero, Maria, 2002. "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
    2. Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    6. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    7. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    8. Sagonti, Emanuela, 1991. "On the Strong Monotonicity of Power Indices," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(1), pages 13-22.
    9. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Dominik Karos, 2013. "Bargaining and Power," Working Papers 2013.63, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Apex Games; Core Stability; Hedonic Games; Strong Monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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