IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fda/fdapop/2021-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

El diseño de reglas fiscales en gobiernos subcentrales. El caso de España

Author

Listed:
  • Fernando González
  • Diego Martínez-López

Abstract

En este artículo se presenta el marco actual de reglas fiscales en GSNs en un país altamente descentralizado, como es España, los principales criterios a discutir en el diseño de dichas reglas fiscales y las líneas de reforma que podrían adoptarse, teniendo en cuenta los nuevos desafíos originados con la pandemia.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando González & Diego Martínez-López, 2021. "El diseño de reglas fiscales en gobiernos subcentrales. El caso de España," Policy Papers 2021-01, FEDEA.
    • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdapop:2021-01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/fpp/2021/02/FPP2021-01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michal Andrle & John C Bluedorn & Luc Eyraud & Tidiane Kinda & Petya Koeva Brooks & Gerd Schwartz & Anke Weber, 2015. "Reforming Fiscal Governance in the European Union," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 15/9, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Mr. Luc Eyraud & Andrew Hodge & Mr. John Ralyea & Julien Reynaud, 2020. "How to Design Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Primer," IMF Fiscal Affairs Department 2020/001, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Luc Eyraud & Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 18/04, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Mar Delgado-Téllez & Esther Gordo & Iván Kataryniuk & Javier J. Pérez, 2022. "The decline in public investment: ``social dominance’’ or too-rigid fiscal rules?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(10), pages 1123-1136, February.
    5. Maria Gadea & Ana Gómez-Loscos & Antonio Montañés, 2012. "Cycles inside cycles: Spanish regional aggregation," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 423-456, December.
    6. Mar Delgado-Téllez & Víctor D. Lledó & Javier J. Pérez, 2016. "On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance: an empirical analysis of spain’s regions," Working Papers 1632, Banco de España.
    7. Diego Martínez‐López, 2022. "Subnational borrowing and bailouts: When the federal government looks at the votes (differently) and its borrowing matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 609-633, June.
    8. European Fiscal Board (EFB), 2019. "2019 annual report of the European Fiscal Board," Annual reports 2019, European Fiscal Board.
    9. Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Kamps, Christophe, 2020. "Debt rule design in theory and practice: the SGP’s debt benchmark revisited," Working Paper Series 2379, European Central Bank.
    10. Mr. Luc Eyraud & Mr. Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Ms. Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules: Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2018/004, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Michal Andrle & Mr. John C Bluedorn & Mr. Luc Eyraud & Mr. Tidiane Kinda & Ms. Petya Koeva Brooks & Mr. Gerd Schwartz & Miss Anke Weber, 2015. "Reforming Fiscal Governance in the European Union," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2015/009, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Luc Eyraud & Andrew Hodge & John Ralyea & Julien Reynaud, 2020. "How to Design Subnational Fiscal Rules; A Primer," IMF Fiscal Affairs Department 20/01, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Alessandro Dovis & Rishabh Kirpalani, 2020. "Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(3), pages 860-888, March.
    14. Mr. Luc Eyraud & Mr. Tao Wu, 2015. "Playing by the Rules: Reforming Fiscal Governance in Europe," IMF Working Papers 2015/067, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mario Alloza & Javier Andrés & Pablo Burriel & Iván Kataryniuk & Javier J. Pérez & Juan Luis Vega, 2021. "La reforma del marco de gobernanza de la política fiscal de la Unión Europea en un nuevo entorno macroeconómico," Occasional Papers 2121, Banco de España.
    2. Mario Alloza & Javier Andrés & Pablo Burriel & Iván Kataryniuk & Javier J. Pérez & Juan Luis Vega, 2021. "The reform of the european Union’s fiscal governance Framework in a new Macroeconomic environment," Occasional Papers 2121, Banco de España.
    3. Marcela De Castro-Valderrama & Nicolas Moreno-Arias & Juan Jose Ospina-Tejeiro, 2023. "Credibility and Bias: The Case for Implementing Both a Debt Anchor and a Balanced Budget Rule," IHEID Working Papers 09-2023, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    4. Marzia Romanelli & Pietro Tommasino & Emilio VadalÃ, 2022. "The future of European fiscal governance: a comprehensive approach," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 691, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Benalal, Nicholai & Freier, Maximilian & Melyn, Wim & Van Parys, Stefan & Reiss, Lukas, 2022. "Towards a single fiscal performance indicator," Occasional Paper Series 288, European Central Bank.
    6. Niklas Potrafke, 2023. "The Economic Consequences of Fiscal Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 10765, CESifo.
    7. Mr. Alvar Kangur & Koralai Kirabaeva & Jean-Marc Natal & Simon Voigts, 2019. "How Informative Are Real Time Output Gap Estimates in Europe?," IMF Working Papers 2019/200, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Ginters Buss & Patrick Gruning & Olegs Tkacevs, 2021. "Choosing the European Fiscal Rule," Working Papers 2021/03, Latvijas Banka.
    9. Niels D. Gilbert & Jasper F.M. Jong, 2017. "Do European fiscal rules induce a bias in fiscal forecasts? Evidence from the Stability and Growth Pact," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 1-32, January.
    10. Federico Diaz Kalan & Ms. Adina Popescu & Julien Reynaud, 2018. "Thou Shalt Not Breach: The Impact on Sovereign Spreads of Noncomplying with the EU Fiscal Rules," IMF Working Papers 2018/087, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2019. "When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 125-141.
    12. Arawatari, Ryo & Ono, Tetsuo, 2021. "Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    13. Ananya Kotia & Victor Duarte Lledo, 2016. "Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe," IMF Working Papers 2016/084, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Luigi Marattin & Simone Meraglia & Raoul Minetti, 2022. "Sovereign bail‐outs and fiscal rules in a banking union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(4), pages 1024-1055, October.
    15. Luc Eyraud & Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 18/04, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Ardanaz, Martín & Ulloa-Suárez, Carolina & Valencia, Oscar, 2024. "Why don't we follow the rules? Drivers of compliance with fiscal policy rules in emerging markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    17. Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Kamps, Christophe, 2020. "Debt rule design in theory and practice: the SGP’s debt benchmark revisited," Working Paper Series 2379, European Central Bank.
    18. Brändle, Thomas & Elsener, Marc, 2023. "Do fiscal rules matter? A survey on recent evidence," Working papers 2023/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    19. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2023. "International coordination of debt rules with time‐inconsistent voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 29-60, February.
    20. Chistoph Grosse-Steffen & Laura Pagenhardt & Malte Rieth, 2021. "Committed to Flexible Fiscal Rules," Working papers 854, Banque de France.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fda:fdapop:2021-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carmen Arias (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.fedea.net .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.