IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fau/wpaper/wp2008_12.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?

Author

Abstract

Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise.

Suggested Citation

  • Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2008_12
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/8778
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    2. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95.
    3. Adam GERŠL, 2008. "Productivity, Export Performance, and Financing of the Czech Corporate Sector: The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 58(05-06), pages 232-247, August.
    4. Schmidt-Mohr, Udo, 1997. "Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1321-1342, July.
    5. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 1999. "Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 153-163, April.
    6. Iichiro Uesugi & Koji Sakai & Guy M. Yamashiro, 2006. "Effectiveness of Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market," Discussion papers 06004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    7. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    8. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June.
    9. J.A. Bikker & L. Spierdijk & P. Finnie, 2007. "The Impact of Market Structure, Contestability and Institutional Environment on Banking Competition," Working Papers 07-29, Utrecht School of Economics.
    10. Claire Lelarge & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2010. "Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints: Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program," NBER Chapters, in: International Differences in Entrepreneurship, pages 243-273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Karel Janda, 2000. "Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2000(3).
    12. Petr JAKUBÍK, 2007. "Macroeconomic Environment and Credit Risk (in English)," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(1-2), pages 60-78, March.
    13. Adam Geršl, 2008. "Performance and financing of the corporate sector: the role of foreign direct investment," Working Papers IES 2008/03, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2008.
    14. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 2000. "Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 215-234, November.
    15. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Steve, 1998. "Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5086, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    16. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Debt Contracts with Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 573-595, August.
    17. Li, Wenli, 2002. "Entrepreneurship and government subsidies: A general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1815-1844, September.
    18. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February.
    19. Adam GERŠL & Michal HLAVACEK, 2007. "Foreign Direct Investment, Corporate Finance, and the Life Cycle of Investment," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(9-10), pages 448-464, October.
    20. William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Crane, Keith & Kohler, Daniel F., 1985. "Removing export-credit subsidies to the Soviet bloc: Who gets hurt and by how much," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 371-390, December.
    22. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
    23. Josh Lerner, 2002. "When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective "Public Venture Capital" Programmes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 73-84, February.
    24. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    25. Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera & Franziska Schobert & Laurent Weill, 2008. "Banking competition and cost efficiency: a micro-data analysis on the Czech banking industry," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/14307, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    26. Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 177-193, June.
    27. Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera & Laurent Weill & Franziska Schobert, 2008. "Banking Competition and Efficiency: A Micro-Data Analysis on the Czech Banking Industry," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 50(2), pages 253-273, June.
    28. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    29. J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Udo Schmidt-Mohr, 1999. "Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 375-396, Autumn.
    30. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    31. Robert Cressy & Otto Toivanen, 2001. "Is there adverse selection in the credit market?," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 215-238, July.
    32. Robert Cressy, 2002. "Introduction: Funding Gaps," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 1-16, February.
    33. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
    34. Grazia Rapisarda & Eleonora Patacchini & University of Southampton, 2003. "A Study of the Effectiveness of Credit Subsidies: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms," Economics Series Working Papers 153, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    35. Arping, Stefan & Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan D., 2010. "Public initiatives to support entrepreneurs: Credit guarantees versus co-funding," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 26-35, April.
    36. Petr Teply & Milan Matejašák, 2007. "Regulation of Bank Capital and Behavior of Banks: Assessing the US and the EU-15 Region Banks in the 2000-2005 Period," Working Papers IES 2007/23, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Aug 2007.
    37. Innes, Robert, 1991. "Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-381, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. Fedele & A. Mantovani & F. Liucci, 2010. "Credit availability in the crisis: which role for the European Investment Bank Group?," Working Papers 699, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. repec:ags:ijag24:344526 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Soliwoda, Michal & Kulawik, Jacek & Wieliczko, Barbara, 2018. "Financial instruments and EU community policies," Village and Agriculture (Wieś i Rolnictwo), Polish Academy of Sciences (IRWiR PAN), Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, vol. 180(3), September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    2. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.
    3. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Rationing and Public Support of Commercial Credit," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp436, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    4. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
    6. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
    7. Schäfer, Dorothea & Werwatz, Axel & Zimmermann, Volker, 2004. "The Determinants of Debt and (Private) Equity Financing : The Case of Young, Innovative SMEs from Germany," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 11(3), pages 225-248.
    8. Alessandro Fedele & Andrea Mantovani & Francesco Liucci, 2010. "Credit Availability in the crisis: which role for the European Investment Bank Group?," Working Papers 1005, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    9. Coco, G. & Pignataro, G., 2011. "Perverse cross-subsidization in the credit market," Working Papers 11/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
    10. Leonardo Becchetti & Melody Garcia, 2008. "Do collateral theories work in social banking ?," CEIS Research Paper 131, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Nov 2008.
    11. Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2004. "The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04021, University of Molise, Department of Economics.
    12. Giuseppe Coco & Giuseppe Pignataro, 2013. "Unfair credit allocations," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 241-251, June.
    13. Schäfer, Dorothea & Werwatz, Axel & Zimmermann, Volker, 2004. "The determinants of debt and (private-) equity financing in young innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/06, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    14. Hainz, Christa & Dinh, Thanh & Kleimeier, Stefanie, 2011. "Collateral and its Determinants: Evidence from Vietnam," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 36, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    15. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
    16. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    17. Scheepens, J.P.J.F., 1993. "Bankruptcy litigation and optimal debt contracts," Other publications TiSEM 64e785e4-4101-4604-a392-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    18. Neyer, Ulrike, 2004. "Asymmetric information in credit markets--implications for the transition in Eastern Germany," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 61-78, March.
    19. Robert E. Carpenter & Bruce C. Petersen, 2002. "Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech Investment, and New Equity Financing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 54-72, February.
    20. Ahlin, Christian & Gulesci, Selim & Madestam, Andreas & Stryjan, Miri, 2020. "Loan contract structure and adverse selection: Survey evidence from Uganda," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 180-195.
    21. Andy Cosh & Douglas Cumming & Alan Hughes, 2009. "Outside Enterpreneurial Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1494-1533, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    information asymmetry; credit; guarantees; subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2008_12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Natalie Svarcova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/icunicz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.