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Workers’ Risk Attitude and Financial Participation

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Abstract

The French "2010 Household Wealth Survey" includes an experimental module that makes it possible to measure risk aversion in an objective manner. Using this survey, we analyse workers’ attitudes towards financial participation with respect to their attitudes towards risk.

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  • Rahma Daly & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Jean-Max Koskievic, 2014. "Workers’ Risk Attitude and Financial Participation," Documents de recherche 14-03, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:14-03
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    Cited by:

    1. Czaya, Axel & Matiaske, Wenzel, 2018. "Finanzielle Mitarbeiterbeteiligung in Deutschland. Gewinn- und Kapitalbeteiligung von Mitarbeitern: Eine Studie vor dem Hintergrund des Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligungsgesetzes und der Wirtschaftskrise ," Working Paper Forschungsförderung 111, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk aversion; financial participation;

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms

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