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Interest rate rules under financial dominance

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  • Vivien Lewis
  • Markus Roth

Abstract

In our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, capital-constrained entrepreneurs finance risky projects by borrowing from banks. Banks make loans using equity and deposits. Because financial contracts are non-state-contingent, bank balance sheets are exposed to entrepreneurial defaults. Macroprudential policy imposes a positive response of the bank capital ratio to lending. Our main result is that the Taylor Principle is violated when this response is too weak. Then macro-prudential policy is ineffective in stabilising debt and monetary policy is subject to ‘financial dominance’. Under a constant bank capital requirement, a strong reaction of the interest rate to inflation destabilises the financial sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Vivien Lewis & Markus Roth, 2015. "Interest rate rules under financial dominance," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 497594, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:497594
    Note: paper number DPS 15.09
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    Cited by:

    1. Grégory Levieuge, 2018. "La politique monétaire doit-elle être utilisée à des fins de stabilité financière ?," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 63-104.
    2. Tom D. Holden, 2024. "Robust Real Rate Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1551, September.
    3. Vivien Lewis & Stefania Villa, 2016. "The Interdependence of Monetary and Macroprudential Policy under the Zero Lower Bound," Working Paper Research 310, National Bank of Belgium.
    4. Chrysanthopoulou Xakousti & Mylonidis Nikolaos & Sidiropoulos Moise, 2024. "Regulatory capital requirements, inflation targeting, and equilibrium determinacy," Working Papers of BETA 2024-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Chang Cheng-Wei & Lai Ching-Chong, 2017. "Macroeconomic (in)stability and endogenous market structure with productive government expenditure," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 1-16, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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