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Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating

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  • Srijit Mishra

Abstract

Using Bayesian updating to deterministic priors persistence of fundamentalist belief like those in the mind of a terrorist is explained. Under such belief system if conditional evidence is diametrically opposite and also deterministic then a process of change will set in and in the present war against terrorism this can be effectively done through Islamic religious authorities. In situations where interaction is the basis, self-defeating scenarios can be avoided by giving space to others’. Thus, in the political sphere one has to be accommodative about the concerns of Middle East, this will also make things easier for intervention through Islam.[Working Paper No. 2003-002]

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  • Srijit Mishra, 2010. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Working Papers id:2563, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2563
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    1. John B. Davis & D. W. Hands & Uskali Mäki (ed.), 1998. "The Handbook of Economic Methodology," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 741, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Srijit Mishra, 2011. "Conflict Resolution through Mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian Updating," Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 41-52.
    2. Srijit Mishra, 2011. "Conflict Resolution through Mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian Updating," Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 41-52.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian updating; fundamentalist belief; interaction; variation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General

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