Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating
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- Srijit Mishra, 2002. "Understanding fundamentalist belief through Bayesian updating," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2003-002, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Srijit Mishra, 2003. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Microeconomics Working Papers 22391, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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- Srijit Mishra, 2002.
"Understanding fundamentalist belief through Bayesian updating,"
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers
2003-002, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Srijit Mishra, 2003. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Microeconomics Working Papers 22391, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Srijit Mishra, 2010. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Working Papers id:2563, eSocialSciences.
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- Srijit Mishra, 2011.
"Conflict Resolution through Mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian Updating,"
Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 41-52.
- Srijit Mishra, 2011. "Conflict resolution through mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian updating," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2011-001, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Srijit Mishra, 2011.
"Conflict Resolution through Mutuality: Lessons from Bayesian Updating,"
Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 41-52.
- Srijit Mishra, 2002. "Understanding fundamentalist belief through Bayesian updating," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2003-002, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Srijit Mishra, 2010. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Working Papers id:2563, eSocialSciences.
- Srijit Mishra, 2003. "Understanding Fundamentalist Belief Through Bayesian Updating," Microeconomics Working Papers 22391, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bayesian updating; fundamentalist belief; interaction; variation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ARA-2010-06-26 (MENA - Middle East and North Africa)
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