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Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying and Discretionary Finance in India

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Abstract

The paper attempts to construct political influence variables and explain discrepancies in fund disbursement through proper econometric specification in the Indian context.

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  • Rongili Biswas, 2009. "Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying and Discretionary Finance in India," Working Papers id:1842, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1842
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
    3. Pincus, J J, 1975. "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 757-778, August.
    4. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    5. Maddala, G S, 1971. "The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 341-358, March.
    6. repec:bla:jecsur:v:11:y:1997:i:2:p:163-90 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Indira Rajaraman, 2007. "The Political Economy of the Indian Fiscal Federation," India Policy Forum, Global Economy and Development Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(1), pages 1-51.
    8. Wright, John R., 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 417-438, June.
    9. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damien Vaquier, 2010. "The Impact of Slum Resettlement on Urban Integration in Mumbai: The Case of the Chandivali Project," Working Papers id:2428, eSocialSciences.
    2. Rongili Biswas & Sugata Marjit & Velayoudom Marimoutou, 2010. "Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying And Discretionary Finance: Evidence From India," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 68-91, March.
    3. Damien Krichewsky, 2010. "Negotiating the Terms of A New Social Contract: Private Companies, Civil Society and the State in India," Working Papers id:2394, eSocialSciences.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political; fund; discretionary; fiscal; federalism; central; state; centre; disbursement; econometric; Indian; economists; politics; finance;
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