IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v19y2003i4p893-897.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75-94]

Author

Listed:
  • Saha, Bibhas

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Saha, Bibhas, 2003. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75-94]," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 893-897, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:893-897
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(03)00046-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    2. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Strand, Jon, 2005. "Tax distortions, household production, and black-market work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 851-871, December.
    2. Bibhas Saha & Trivikraman Thampy, 2004. "Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs," Microeconomics Working Papers 22392, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    3. Saha, Bibhas & Thampy, Trivikraman, 2006. "Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 182-204, June.
    4. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2003. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy: reply," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 899-900, November.
    5. Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 438-453, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vafai, Kouroche, 2002. "Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1143-1166, October.
    2. Mawani, Amin & Trivedi, Viswanath Umashanker, 2021. "Collusive vs. coercively corrupt tax auditors and their impact on tax compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    3. Bibhas Saha & Trivikraman Thampy, 2004. "Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs," Microeconomics Working Papers 22392, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    4. Ajit Mishra, 2005. "Optimal Enforcement Policies Under the Threat of Collusion and Extortion," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 184, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    5. Katarzyna Bilicka & André Seidel, 2020. "Profit shifting and corruption," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(5), pages 1051-1080, October.
    6. Saha, Bibhas & Thampy, Trivikraman, 2006. "Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 182-204, June.
    7. Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 438-453, September.
    8. Ajit Mishra, 2004. "Corruption: A Review," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 170, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    9. Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan.
    10. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
    11. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
    12. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    13. Branimir Jovanovic, 2015. "Kalman Filter Estimation of the Unrecorded Economy in Macedonia," Working Papers 2015-02, National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia.
    14. Maria Kravtsova & Aleksey Oshchepkov, 2019. "Market And Network Corruption," HSE Working papers WP BRP 209/EC/2019, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Nino Kokashvili & Irakli Barbakadze & Ketevani Kapanadze, 2017. "How Participating In The Shadow Economy Affects The Growth Of Latvian Firms," University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series 101, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu (Estonia).
    16. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
    17. Godin, M. & Hindriks, J., 2015. "A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017. "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
    19. Lahiri, Bidisha & Ali, Haider, 2022. "Inspections, informal payments and tax payments by firms," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
    20. CHEN, Xuezheng & GUI, Lin & WU, Tao & ZHANG, Jun, 2024. "A theory of symbiotic corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 478-494.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:893-897. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.