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Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft

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  • Marcel Thum

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem Verhältnis von Schattenwirtschaft und Korruption auseinander. Es wird insbesondere die Frage untersucht, welche Rolle die Schattenwirtschaft in korrupten Ökonomien spielt. Die Schattenwirtschaft begrenzt letztendlich die Macht korrupter Institutionen, indem sie Unternehmen eine Ausweichmöglichkeit schafft, und ermöglicht so eine Ausdehnung produktiver Tätigkeiten, die gesamtwirtschaftlich vorteilhaft ist. Der Beitrag untersucht auch, wie sich institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen und Politikmaßnahmen auf Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft auswirken.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Thum, 2005. "Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft," ifo Working Paper Series No.12, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_no.12
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    Cited by:

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    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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