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Politics, Economics, and Violence: the Organization of Societies and Third-Party Enforcement

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  • John Wallis

    (University of Maryland and NBER)

Abstract

The question “Who will guard the guardians?” is at the heart of a set of questions about how politics and economics interact. If government provision of justice and protection to societies is an integral part of how well societies perform in economic and political terms, how is it that governments are constrained to perform their functions as agreed in the explicit or implicit social contract? This short essay uses the conceptual framework developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast in Violence and Social Orders (2009, hereafter NWW) to think about the nexus between governments and economies and the nature of their interaction, particularly the ability of governments to enforce rules by serving as an unbiased third-party enforcer of public laws as well as contracts entered into by private individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • John Wallis, 2011. "Politics, Economics, and Violence: the Organization of Societies and Third-Party Enforcement," Working Papers 634, Economic Research Forum, revised 09 Jan 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:634
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444, October.
    2. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    3. Wallis, John Joseph, 2011. "Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 48-64.
    4. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, September.
    5. Wallis, John Joseph, 2011. "Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 48-64, June.
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