IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/enp/wpaper/eprg1707.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Equilibrium supply security in a multinational electricity market with renewable production

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas P. Tangerås

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden and Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG), University of Cambridge)

Abstract

An increasing reliance on solar and wind power has raised concern about system ability to consistently satisfy electricity demand. This paper examines countries' unilateral incentives to achieve supply security through capacity reserves and market integration in a multinational electricity market. Capacity reserves protect consumers against blackouts and extreme prices, but distort consumption and investment. Market integration alleviates supply constraints, but requires costly network reinforcement. Capacity reserves can be up- or downward distorted, but network investment is always insufficient in equilibrium. Capacity reserves are smaller when there are financial markets or when dispatched solely to resolve domestic supply constraints.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas P. Tangerås, 2017. "Equilibrium supply security in a multinational electricity market with renewable production," Working Papers EPRG 1707, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1707
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/eprg-wp1707.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meyer, Roland & Gore, Olga, 2015. "Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms: Do uncoordinated market design changes contradict the goals of the European market integration?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 9-20.
    2. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Reliability and competitive electricity markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 60-84, March.
    3. Neuhoff, Karsten & Diekmann, Jochen & Kunz, Friedrich & Rüster, Sophia & Schill, Wolf-Peter & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2016. "A coordinated strategic reserve to safeguard the European energy transition," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 252-263.
    4. Newbery, David, 2016. "Missing money and missing markets: Reliability, capacity auctions and interconnectors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 401-410.
    5. William W. Hogan, 2013. "Electricity Scarcity Pricing Through Operating Reserves," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    6. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2006. "The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity," Papers of Peter Cramton 06mdfra, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2006.
    7. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    8. Wolak, Frank A., 2003. "Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(7), pages 11-37.
    9. Creti, Anna & Fabra, Natalia, 2007. "Supply security and short-run capacity markets for electricity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 259-276, March.
    10. Hendrik Bessembinder & Michael L. Lemmon, 2002. "Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity Forward Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1347-1382, June.
    11. Schwenen, Sebastian, 2014. "Market design and supply security in imperfect power markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 256-263.
    12. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft, 2013. "Capacity Market Fundamentals," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Holmberg, P. & Ritz, R., 2019. "Capacity mechanisms and the technology mix in competitive electricity markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1960, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Bastos, João Pedro & Cunha, Gabriel & Barroso, Luiz Augusto & Aquino, Thereza, 2018. "Reliability mechanism design: An economic approach to enhance adequate remuneration and enable efficient expansion," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 1150-1159.
    3. Zhenyu Zhao & Huijia Yang, 2020. "Regional Security Assessment of Integrated Energy Systems with Renewables in China: A Grid-Connected Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-18, December.
    4. Persson, Lars & Tangerås, Thomas, 2018. "Transmission Network Investment across National Borders: The Liberalized Nordic Electricity Market," Working Paper Series 1242, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    2. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.
    3. Fabra, Natalia, 2018. "A primer on capacity mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 323-335.
    4. Traber, Thure, 2017. "Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms for Reliability in the Integrated European Electricity Market: Effects on Welfare and Distribution through 2023," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-14.
    5. Sebastian Schäfer & Lisa Altvater, 2019. "On the functioning of a capacity market with an increasing share of renewable energy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 59-84, August.
    6. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    7. Mier, Mathias, 2021. "Efficient pricing of electricity revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    8. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Simshauser, P. & Gilmore, J., 2020. "Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2048, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Simshauser, Paul, 2019. "Missing money, missing policy and Resource Adequacy in Australia's National Electricity Market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    11. Simshauser, Paul, 2020. "Merchant renewables and the valuation of peaking plant in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    12. Bhagwat, Pradyumna C. & de Vries, Laurens J. & Hobbs, Benjamin F., 2016. "Expert survey on capacity markets in the US: Lessons for the EU," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 11-17.
    13. Chi Kong Chyong & Michael Pollitt & Reuben Cruise, 2019. "Can wholesale electricity prices support "subsidy-free" generation investment in Europe?," Working Papers EPRG1919, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    14. Milstein, Irena & Tishler, Asher, 2019. "On the effects of capacity payments in competitive electricity markets: Capacity adequacy, price cap, and reliability," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 370-385.
    15. Csereklyei, Zsuzsanna & Kallies, Anne, 2022. "A legal-economic framework of electricity markets: Assessing Australia’s transition," MPRA Paper 114191, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Lukas Block & Bastian Westbrock, 2022. "Capacity investments in a competitive energy market," Working Papers Dissertations 95, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    17. Lambin, Xavier, 2020. "Integration of Demand Response in Electricity Market Capacity Mechanisms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    18. Bichuch, Maxim & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Song, Xinyue, 2023. "Identifying optimal capacity expansion and differentiated capacity payments under risk aversion and market power: A financial Stackelberg game approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    19. Peter Cramton, 2022. "Fostering Resiliency with Good Market Design: Lessons from Texas," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 145, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    20. Growitsch, Christian & Just, Lisa & Pedell, Burkhard, 2014. "Risk Assessment of Investments in Energy-only and Capacity Markets," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(3), pages 181-188.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capacity mechanism; decentralized policy making; multinational electricity market; network investment; security of supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1707. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ruth Newman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jicamuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.