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Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure

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  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.
  • Veerman, C.P.

Abstract

The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favorable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterized by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organizational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Veerman, C.P., 2000. "Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2000-09-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    finance; marketing cooperative; transaction costs economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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