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Trump’s victory like Harrison, not Hayes and Bush

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrice Barthélémy
  • Mathieu Martin
  • Ashley Piggins

    (CEMOTEV, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, France)

Abstract

Donald Trump won the 2016 U.S. Presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888 and 2000. In our earlier paper “The architecture of the Electoral College, the House size effect, and the referendum paradox” (Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 111-118), we analyzed these earlier elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the House of Representatives. A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the winner of the popular vote in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. In this note we show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888, and unlike 1876 and 2000. This note updates the analysis of our earlier paper to include the 2016 election.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin & Ashley Piggins, 2017. "Trump’s victory like Harrison, not Hayes and Bush," THEMA Working Papers 2017-22, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2017-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350.
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