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The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

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  • Iñarra García, María Elena
  • Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción
  • Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel

Abstract

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

Suggested Citation

  • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2012. "The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games," IKERLANAK 1576-1857, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:9148
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    1. Antoni Calvó-Armengol, 2003. "The Set of Correlated Equilibria 2 x 2 Games," Working Papers 79, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Noritsugu Nakanishi, 2001. "On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 291-307.
    3. Von Stengel, Bernhard, 2002. "Computing equilibria for two-person games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 1723-1759, Elsevier.
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