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Aggregate implications of defined benefit and defined contribution systems

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  • Gomes, Francisco
  • Michaelides, Alexander

Abstract

We use a general equilibrium life-cycle model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of Defined Benefit (DB) versus Defined Contribution (DC) systems, and to investigate the effects of incremental reform within a particular system. Extensive calibrations illustrate the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution that a tax-financed, DB social security system generates. We find that social welfare is maximized for small but positive levels of DB because of the redistributive value associated with these systems. On the other hand, steady-state within- DC system comparisons reveal that a zero DC tax rate maximizes social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Gomes, Francisco & Michaelides, Alexander, 2003. "Aggregate implications of defined benefit and defined contribution systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24868, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:24868
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    1. Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B. (ed.), 2002. "The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226241067, August.
    2. Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2002. "The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld02-1.
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    5. MaCurdy, Thomas E., 1982. "The use of time series processes to model the error structure of earnings in a longitudinal data analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 83-114, January.
    6. Juan C. Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 1999. "Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 757-795, October.
    7. John Laitner, 2001. "Wealth Accumulation in the U.S.: Do Inheritances and Bequests Play a Significant Role?," Working Papers wp019, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    8. Karen E. Dynan & Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, 2002. "The Importance of Bequests and Life-Cycle Saving in Capital Accumulation: A New Answer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 274-278, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Määttänen, Niku & Poutvaara, Panu, 2006. "Should Old-age Benefits Be Earnings-tested," Discussion Papers 1062, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    2. Cocco, Joao F. & Lopes, Paula, 2004. "Defined benefit or defined contribution?: An empirical study of pension choices," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24751, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    general equilibrium; liquidity constraints; heterogeneous agents; undiversifiable labor income; defined benefit systems; defined contribution systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

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