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The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase

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  • de Meza, David
  • Lockwood, Ben

Abstract

The standard property-rights theory of the firm assumes that prior to investing in human capital, team members meet and negotiate asset ownership. This paper endogenizes the event sequence in a matching model of market equilibrium. Equilibria exist in which, for strategic and efficiency reasons, agents invest in human capital and buy assets prior to matching and simple ownership arrangements are chosen. As in the original work, ownership of physical assets affects the incentive to invest. However, in this setting ownership creates rent shifting, search and asset transfer advantages, so new results emerge. It is no longer necessarily true that key agents own. As for the form of integration, there may be multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben, 1998. "The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19351, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:19351
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19351/
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, January.
    2. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, 01.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; incomplete contracts; matching; asset ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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