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Better than nothing: on defining the valence of a life

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  • Brown, Campbell

Abstract

The valence of a life – that is, whether it is good, bad or neutral – is an important consideration in population ethics. This paper examines various definitions of valence. The main focus is ‘temporal’ definitions, which define valence in terms of the ‘shape’ of a life’s value over time. The paper argues that temporal definitions are viable only with a restricted domain, and therefore are incompatible with certain substantive theories of well-being. It also briefly considers some popular non-temporal definitions, and raises some problems for these.

Suggested Citation

  • Brown, Campbell, 2023. "Better than nothing: on defining the valence of a life," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120063, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:120063
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/120063/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blackorby,Charles & Bossert,Walter & Donaldson,David J., 2005. "Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521532587, January.
    2. Johansson, Jens, 2010. "Being and Betterness," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 285-302, September.
    3. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 1997. "Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population-Ethics Dilemma," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 197-230, October.
    4. Arrhenius, Gustaf, 2000. "An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 247-266, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    well-being; life; population ethics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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