IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/sirdps/505.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contracting over Prices

Author

Listed:
  • Chatterji, S.
  • Ghosal, Sayantan

Abstract

We defi ne a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging in non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. In a setting with subjective uncertainty over future prices, we show that perfectly contracted equi- librium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to di er from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Chatterji, S. & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2013. "Contracting over Prices," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-88, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:505
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/505
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ho-Mou Wu & Mordecai Kurz, 1996. "Endogenous uncertainty in a general equilibrium model with price contingent contracts (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(3), pages 461-488.
    2. Henrotte, Philippe, 1996. "Construction of a State Space for Interrelated Securities with an Application to Temporary Equilibrium Theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(3), pages 423-459, October.
    3. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2006. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 485-516, June.
    4. Allan M. Feldman, 1973. "Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(4), pages 463-473.
    5. Kurz, Mordecai, 1994. "On Rational Belief Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 859-876, October.
    6. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
    7. Philippe Henrotte, 1996. "Construction of a state space for interrelated securities with an application to temporary equilibrium theory (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(3), pages 423-459.
    8. Green, Jerry R, 1973. "Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1103-1123, November.
    9. Radner, Roy, 1972. "Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(2), pages 289-303, March.
    10. Svensson, Lars E O, 1981. "Efficiency and Speculation in a Model with Price-Contingent Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 131-151, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Kajii, Atsushi, 2023. "Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    2. Shurojit Chatterji & Atsushi Kajii & Huaxia Zeng, 2018. "Intertemporal effiiency does not imply a common price forecast," KIER Working Papers 999, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Shurojit Chatterji & Atsushi Kajii & Huaxia Zeng, 2018. "Intertemporal efficiency does not imply a common price forecast: a leading example," KIER Working Papers 992, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. João Correia-da-Silva, 2015. "Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 509-525, August.
    2. Mordecai Kurz, 1997. "Social States of Belief and the Determinants of the Equity Risk Premium in A Rational Belief Equilibrium," Working Papers 97026, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    3. Chatterji, Shurojit & Kajii, Atsushi, 2023. "Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    4. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2018. "Sequential equilibrium without rational expectations of prices: A theorem of full existence," Post-Print halshs-01593567, HAL.
    5. David Bowman, 1995. "Constrained suboptimality in economies with limited communication," International Finance Discussion Papers 497, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    7. Lionel de Boisde¤re, 2021. "Equilibrium in incomplete markets with differential information: A basic model of generic existence," Post-Print halshs-03196857, HAL.
    8. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2018. "Dropping Rational Expectations," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18026, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2018. "Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence," Working papers of CATT hal-02141059, HAL.
    10. Lionel de Boisde¤re, 2021. "Dropping Rational Expectations," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03196897, HAL.
    11. Lionel DE BOISDEFFRE, 2018. "Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence," Working Papers 2017-2018_8, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Jun 2018.
    12. Lionel de Boisde¤re, 2021. "Equilibrium in incomplete markets with differential information: A basic model of generic existence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03196857, HAL.
    13. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2018. "Dropping Rational Expectations," Post-Print halshs-01903510, HAL.
    14. Lionel de Boisde¤re, 2021. "Dropping Rational Expectations," Post-Print halshs-03196897, HAL.
    15. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2017. "Sequential equilibrium without rational expectations of prices: A theorem of full existence," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17036r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2018.
    16. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2018. "Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence," Working Papers hal-02141059, HAL.
    17. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2018. "Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02141059, HAL.
    18. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2018. "Dropping Rational Expectations," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01903510, HAL.
    19. de Boisdeffre, Lionel, 2021. "Equilibrium in incomplete markets with differential information: A basic model of generic existence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 53-62.
    20. Sarah Auster & Jeremy Kettering & Asen Kochov, 2021. "Sequential Trading With Coarse Contingencies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_254, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    equilibrium; future prices; uncertainty; contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:505. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Research Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sireeuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.