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Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

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Abstract

This paper analyses a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady-state properties of the private unemployment insurance scheme are established.Theinteractionbetweenthepublicandprivateunemploymentinsurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one-to-one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximising.

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  • Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 95, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:95
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    13. Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Broer, 2013. "The Wrong Shape of Insurance? What Cross-Sectional Distributions Tell Us about Models of Consumption Smoothing," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 107-140, October.
    2. Dirk Krueger & Fulin Li & Harald Uhlig, 2024. "Neoclassical Growth Transition Dynamics with One-Sided Commitment," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 794-809.
    4. Krueger, Dirk & Perri, Fabrizio, 2011. "Public versus private risk sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 920-956, May.
    5. Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia & Worrall, Tim S, 2020. "Optimal Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 15540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Mazur, Karol, 2023. "Sharing risk to avoid tragedy: Informal insurance and irrigation in village economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    7. Lin, Wanchuan & Meng, Juanjuan & Weng, Xi, 2020. "Formal insurance and informal risk sharing dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 837-863.
    8. Krzysztof Szczygielski, 2021. "Public provisions of professional services," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(2), pages 345-362, April.
    9. Lee, Hangsuck & Ryu, Doojin & Son, Jihoon, 2022. "Insurance-adjusted valuation, decision making, and capital return," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    10. Oikonomou Rigas, 2018. "Unemployment insurance with limited commitment wage contracts and savings," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    11. Picard, Pierre M. & Worrall, Tim, 2020. "Currency areas and voluntary transfers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    12. Broer, Tobias, 2014. "Domestic or global imbalances? Rising income risk and the fall in the US current account," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 47-67.
    13. Lin, Wanchuan & Liu, Yiming & Meng, Juanjuan, 2014. "The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 184-211.
    14. Tim Worrall & Alessia Russo & Francesco Lancia, 2017. "Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance," 2017 Meeting Papers 319, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Dirk Krueger, 2006. "Public Insurance against Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk: The Case of Social Security and Progressive Income Taxation," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(4), pages 587-620, December.
    16. Broer, Tobias, 2011. "Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 957-975, May.
    17. Karol Mazur, 2020. "Sharing Risk to Avoid Tragedy: Informal Insurance and Irrigation in Village Economies," CSAE Working Paper Series 2020-19, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social insurance; moral hazard; limited commitment; unemployment insurance; crowding out;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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