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Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

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  • Whinston, Michael D.

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  • Whinston, Michael D., 1983. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:49-71
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    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Regis Barnichon & Yanos Zylberberg, 2022. "A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(1), pages 118-141.
    3. Chambers, Robert G., 1989. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms," Working Papers 197741, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    4. Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 151-181, February.
    5. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2013. "A continuous model of income insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(6), pages 938-960, December.
    6. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2006. "A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms," Working Paper Series 659, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2013. "Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 19317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 257-279, April.
    9. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2006. "Disability insurance and optimal income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(6), pages 717-732, November.
    10. Hao Zhang & Guangwen Kong & Sampath Rajagopalan, 2018. "Contract Design by Service Providers with Private Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2672-2689, June.
    11. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    12. Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision," Public Economics 0211002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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