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Technical progress and product reliability under competition and monopoly

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Abstract

Technical progress lowers costs and prices but appears to have an ambiguous effect on product reliability. This paper presents a simple model which explains this observation.

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  • Donald A. R. George, 2011. "Technical progress and product reliability under competition and monopoly," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 211, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:211
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