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Contingent protection as better insurance

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  • Ronald D. Fischer
  • 1998

Abstract

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail and export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e. taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald D. Fischer & 1998, 1998. "Contingent protection as better insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 49, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:49
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(1994 Micr), pages 51-118.
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    7. Robert E. Baldwin, 1982. "The Political Economy of Protectionism," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 263-292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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