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Institutions versus Policies: A Tale of Two Islands

Author

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  • Henry, Peter B.

    (Stanford University)

  • Miller, Conrad

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Recent work emphasizes the primacy of differences in countries' colonially-bequeathed property rights and legal systems for explaining differences in their subsequent economic development. Barbados and Jamaica provide a striking counter example to this long-run view of income determination. Both countries inherited property rights and legal institutions from their English colonial masters yet experienced starkly different growth trajectories in the aftermath of independence. From 1960 to 2002, Barbados' GDP per capita grew roughly three times as fast as Jamaica's. Consequently, the income gap between Barbados and Jamaica is now almost five times larger than at the time of independence. Since their property rights and legal systems are virtually identical, recent theories of development cannot explain the divergence between Barbados and Jamaica. Differences in macroeconomic policy choices, not differences in institutions, account for the heterogeneous growth experiences of these two Caribbean nations.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry, Peter B. & Miller, Conrad, 2008. "Institutions versus Policies: A Tale of Two Islands," Research Papers 2012, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2012
    as

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2012.pdf
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    Cited by:

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    3. Anusha Chari & Peter Blair Henry, 2015. "Two Tales of Adjustment: East Asian Lessons for European Growth," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(1), pages 164-196, May.
    4. Morgan, Horatio M., 2013. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: New Lessons from Small Open Economies," MPRA Paper 49842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Charles, Don & McLean, Sheldon, 2020. "A preliminary review of policy responses to enhance SME access to trade financing in the Caribbean," Studies and Perspectives – ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for The Caribbean 45101, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    6. Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Economics, History, and Causation," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 39-63, April.
    7. Thorvaldur Gylfason & Eduard Hochreiter, 2011. "Growing Together: Croatia and Latvia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 53(2), pages 165-197, June.
    8. Raphael Semet & Thierry Roncalli & Lauren Stagnol, 2021. "ESG and Sovereign Risk: What is Priced in by the Bond Market and Credit Rating Agencies?," Papers 2110.06617, arXiv.org.
    9. Douglas A. Irwin & Richard Sylla, 2010. "The Significance of the Founding Choices: Editors' Introduction," NBER Chapters, in: Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, pages 1-21, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    12. Reda Cherif & Fuad Hasanov, 2019. "The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy," IMF Working Papers 2019/074, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Brown, Craig O., 2020. "Economic leadership and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 298-333.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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