Theories of Delegation in Political Science
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- Bendor, J. & Glazer, A. & Hammond, T.H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Papers 00-01-14, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
- Frederick J. Boehmke & Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2005. "Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making," Public Economics 0502009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2017. "Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 887-900, April.
- Dan Palmon & Marietta Peytcheva & Ari Yezegel, 2011. "The Accounting Standards Setting Process in the U.S.: Examination of the SEC–FASB Relationship," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 165-183, March.
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- Mark Gradstein & Michael Kaganovich, 2018. "Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 7076, CESifo.
- Gradstein, Mark & Kaganovich, Michael, 2018. "Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 13256, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Nye, 2007. "Killing Private Ryan: An Institutional Analysis of Military Decision Making in World War II," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 281-308, September.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
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