Are independent central banks really as conservative as they like to pretend?
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Cited by:
- Arghyrou, Michael G. & Gadea, Maria Dolores, 2012.
"The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain,"
Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 16-34.
- Arghyrou, Michael G & Gadea, Maria Dolores, 2008. "The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/23, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Michael G. Arghyrou & Maria Dolores Gadea, 2008. "The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain," Documentos de Trabajo dt2008-05, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
- Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2011.
"Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus,"
Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 638-662.
- Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2008. "Political Cycles in a Small Open Economy and the Effect of Economic Integration: Evidence from Cyprus," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0808, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
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