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Fiscal convergence before entering the EMU

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  • Onorante, Luca

Abstract

The monetary integration of the acceding countries will proceed in several distinct steps, starting with membership in the European Union (EU), followed by participation in the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II and ultimately entry into the euro area. This paper addresses the question of whether a reduction of public deficits, such as imposed by the Maastricht fiscal criteria, is a necessary or useful step on the road to the adoption of the euro. The question is addressed by examining the interaction of monetary, fiscal and wage policies and their effects on prices in a monetary union hit by economic shocks. The theoretical model shows that fiscal activism is related with both entry in monetary union and with structural differences in the national labour markets, and analyses in detail the effect of both factors. As for acceding countries, the conclusion is that the process of deficit reduction should be completed before entry, as suggested by the Maastricht criteria. The chapter also suggests that fiscal constraints on government deficits appear essential in a monetary union when the wage formation is taken into due consideration. JEL Classification: E61, E62, H30

Suggested Citation

  • Onorante, Luca, 2006. "Fiscal convergence before entering the EMU," Working Paper Series 664, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2006664
    Note: 412615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William D. Nordhaus, 1994. "Policy games: Coordination and Independece in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(2), pages 139-216.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    3. Beetsma,R. & Favero,C. & Missale,A. & Muscatelli,V. A. & Natale,P. & Tirelli,P. (ed.), 2004. "Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521823081, January.
    4. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
    5. Luca Onorante, 2004. "Fiscal, monetary and wage policies in a MU: is there a need for fiscal rules?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 73, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    6. Luca Onorante, 2006. "Interaction of Fiscal Policies on the Euro Area: How Much Pressure on the ECB?," Economics Working Papers ECO2006/9, European University Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simplice Asongu, 2014. "Are proposed African monetary unions optimal currency areas? Real, monetary and fiscal policy convergence analysis," African Journal of Economic and Management Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(1), pages 9-29, April.
    2. Țibulcă Ioana Laura, 2015. "Does Fiscal Convergence Lead to tax Convergence? Evidence from the Eurozone," Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 62(s1), pages 1-9, October.
    3. Sánchez, Marcelo, 2008. "Monetary stabilisation in a currency union of small open economies," Working Paper Series 927, European Central Bank.
    4. Schnatz, Bernd, 2006. "Is reversion to PPP in euro exchange rates non-linear?," Working Paper Series 682, European Central Bank.
    5. Tatomir Cristina Flavia & Alexe Ileana, 2012. "Fiscal Discipline And Convergence Of The Euro Area Candidates. Closer To The Performers Or To The Laggards?," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 163-168, July.
    6. Crespo-Cuaresma, Jesús & Fernández-Amador, Octavio, 2013. "Business cycle convergence in EMU: A first look at the second moment," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 265-284.
    7. Schalck, Christophe, 2012. "Investigating heterogeneity in European fiscal behaviours," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 383-390.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Monetary Union; fiscal policy; fiscal rules; monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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