IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/4790.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monetary and Fiscal policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve

Author

Listed:
  • Bofinger, Peter
  • Mayer, Eric

Abstract

In this Paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macromodel a la Clarida Gali Gertler (1999) to a monetary union. We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it prevents that national real interest rates can drive a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In particular small countries are vulnerable and therefore in need of fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath.

Suggested Citation

  • Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 4790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4790
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP4790
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Bofinger & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2003. "Managed Floating as a Monetary Policy Strategy," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 81-109, June.
    2. Orphanides, Athanasios & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Inflation zone targeting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1351-1387, June.
    3. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    5. Lars E. O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Implementing Optimal Policy through Inflation-Forecast Targeting," NBER Chapters, in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bas Van Aarle & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 748, CESifo.
    7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    8. Svensson, Lars E. O., 2002. "Inflation targeting: Should it be modeled as an instrument rule or a targeting rule?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 771-780, May.
    9. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    10. Carl E. Walsh, 2003. "Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232316, April.
    11. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Jensen, Henrik, 2005. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 320-352, December.
    12. Bofinger, Peter & Wollmershäuser, Timo, 2001. "Managed Floating: Understanding the New International Monetary Order," CEPR Discussion Papers 3064, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2003. "Fiscal and monetary policy coordination in EMU," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 279-295.
    14. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    15. Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2002. "ìNew" Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is EMU Telling US?," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 140, Royal Economic Society.
    16. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2007. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2399-2408, November.
    17. Galí, Jordi & Perotti, Roberto, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 3933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    19. Anton Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions over the Cycle: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 2002_13, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002.
    20. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:70:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 2003. "Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 657-665, July.
    22. Coenen, Günter, 2003. "Zero lower bound: is it a problem in the euro area?," Working Paper Series 269, European Central Bank.
    23. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2004. "An independent central bank faced with elected governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 907-922, November.
    24. Athanasios Orphanides & David W. Wilcox, 2002. "The Opportunistic Approach to Disinflation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 47-71.
    25. Fabio Busetti & Lorenzo Forni & Andrew Harvey & Fabrizio Venditti, 2007. "Inflation Convergence and Divergence within the European Monetary Union," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(2), pages 95-121, June.
    26. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Discussion Paper 2002-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    27. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "Teaching Inflation Targeting: An Analysis for Intermediate Macro," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 333-346, December.
    28. Beetsma,R. & Favero,C. & Missale,A. & Muscatelli,V. A. & Natale,P. & Tirelli,P. (ed.), 2004. "Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521823081, September.
    29. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
    30. Bofinger, Peter, 2001. "Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248568.
    31. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Other publications TiSEM f2cdcc6c-329f-4ae6-915b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    32. Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric & Wollmershäuser, Timo, 2002. "The BMW model: Simple macroeconomics for closed and open economies a requiem for the IS/LM-AS/AD and the Mundell-Fleming model," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 35, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    33. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    34. Peter Bofinger & Eric Mayer & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2006. "The BMW Model: A New Framework for Teaching Monetary Economics," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 98-117, January.
    35. Dornbusch, Rudi, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 221-223, May.
    36. Angeloni Ignazio & Ehrmann Michael, 2007. "Euro Area Inflation Differentials," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-36, August.
    37. Canova, Fabio & Pappa, Evi, 2003. "Price Dispersions in Monetary Unions: The Role of Fiscal Shocks," CEPR Discussion Papers 3746, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    38. Jordi Galí & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe [‘Consumption smoothing through fiscal policy in OECD and EU countries’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 533-572.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pasquale Foresti, 2015. "Monetary and debt-concerned fiscal policies interaction in monetary unions," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 541-552, October.
    2. Plamen Nikolov & Paolo Pasimeni, 2023. "Fiscal Stabilization in the United States: Lessons for Monetary Unions," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 113-153, February.
    3. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2021. "Policy conflict, coordination, and leadership in a monetary union under imperfect instrument substitutability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 342-361.
    4. Capasso, Salvatore & Foresti, Pasquale, 2024. "Monetary-fiscal policies design and financial shocks in currency unions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 124371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    6. Angelo Baglioni & Andrea Boitani & Massimo Bordignon, 2016. "Labor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 72(4), pages 371-406, December.
    7. Salvatore Capasso & Pasquale Foresti, 2024. "Monetary-fiscal policies design and financial shocks in currency unions," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 41(2), pages 439-455, July.
    8. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2016. "Can monetary policy fully stabilize pure demand shocks in a monetary union with a fiscal leader?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 463-468.
    9. Sell, Friedrich L., 2005. "Zins- und Geldmengensteuerung in der offenen Volkswirtschaft: Eine Referenz an William Poole (und zugleich eine Kritik an der "Neuen Keynesianischen Makroökonomik")," Working Papers in Economics 2005,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    10. Peter Bofinger, 2024. "Fighting inflation with conventional and unconventional fiscal policy," IMK Studies 92-2024, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    11. Zongsen Zou & Xiuling Wang & Dengtian Feng, 2020. "Adhere to the rules or be discretionary? Empirical evidence from the euro area," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 501-525, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:got:cegedp:27 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Oliver Grimm & Stefan Ried, 2007. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/67, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. Evers, Michael P., 2012. "Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 507-525.
    4. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    5. Hubert Kempf & Leopold von Thadden, 2007. "On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ?," 2007 Meeting Papers 801, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Pappa, Evi & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2007. "The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1492-1513, August.
    7. Ignacy Święcicki & Jan J. Michałek, 2014. "Sources of difficulties in coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the European Economic and Monetary Union," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 39.
    8. Roel Beetsma & Massimo Giuliodori, 2010. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 603-641, September.
    9. P Arestis & A Mihailov, 2009. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 14(2), pages 27-54, September.
    10. repec:rdg:wpaper:em-dp2007-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-028 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Totzek, Alexander & Wohltmann, Hans-Werner, 2010. "Barro-Gordon revisited: reputational equilibria in a New Keynesian model," Economics Working Papers 2010-04, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    13. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2004. "Timeless perspective vs. discretionary monetary policy in forward-looking models," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Mar), pages 43-56.
    14. Oliver Landmann, 2012. "Rotating Slumps in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 303-317, April.
    15. Torben Andersen, 2005. "Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1447, CESifo.
    16. Sánchez, Marcelo, 2008. "Monetary stabilisation in a currency union of small open economies," Working Paper Series 927, European Central Bank.
    17. Oros, Cornel & Zimmer, Blandine, 2015. "Uncertainty and fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why does monetary policy transmission matter?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 85-93.
    18. Naveen Srinivasan & Vidya Mahambare & M. Ramachandran, 2006. "UK monetary policy under inflation forecast targeting: is behaviour consistent with symmetric preferences?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 706-721, October.
    19. Zongsen Zou & Xiuling Wang & Dengtian Feng, 2020. "Adhere to the rules or be discretionary? Empirical evidence from the euro area," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 501-525, April.
    20. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2004. "Prudent Monetary Policy: Applications of Cautious LQG Control and Prediction," CEPR Discussion Papers 4222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Shawn Chen‐Yu Leu & Jeffrey Sheen, 2006. "Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(s1), pages 85-96, September.
    22. Dennis, Richard & Soderstrom, Ulf, 2006. "How Important Is Precommitment for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 847-872, June.
    23. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2005. "Targeting versus instrument rules for monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 87(Sep), pages 597-612.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Inflation targeting; Fiscal policy; Policy coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4790. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.