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The role of national central banks in banking supervision in selected central and eastern European countries

Author

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  • Apinis, Marcis
  • Bodzioch, Magdalena
  • Csongrádi, Erika
  • Filipova, Tatyana
  • Foit, Zdenĕk
  • Jiménez-Rodríguez, Rebeca
  • Porzycki, Marek
  • Vetrák, Milan

Abstract

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia have recently undertaken substantial reforms of their supervisory frameworks, aimed at reducing the number of supervisory authorities operating in the domestic financial sector. This working paper examines from a legal perspective national central bank (NCB) involvement in banking supervision in the above-mentioned countries and, in the light of this comparative examination, draws conclusions about the nature and scope of that involvement. The analysis reveals that the trend towards consolidation of supervisory authorities is not always linked to a tendency to diminish or suspend NCB powers in the area of banking supervision: in three of the countries reviewed, the NCBs have sole competence for banking supervision, and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, integrated supervision has even been placed under the NCB's roof. In the jurisdictions where the NCBs do not perform the supervisory function, the NCBs have nevertheless remained involved in supervision in many different ways, they have a substantial involvement in the preparation of legislation relating to supervision; they may influence the performance of the supervisory function by interaction with the supervisory authorities at the level of their decision-making bodies, through the conclusion of agreements, establishment of common bodies, etc.; and finally NCBs have also demonstrated some capacity to influence the operational side of banking supervision in the areas of licensing, on-going supervision and the imposition of sanctions or remedial measures in the case of breaches of supervisory law requirements. This working paper takes into account the legislation in force in the seven Member States under consideration as at 1 November 2009. JEL Classification: K

Suggested Citation

  • Apinis, Marcis & Bodzioch, Magdalena & Csongrádi, Erika & Filipova, Tatyana & Foit, Zdenĕk & Jiménez-Rodríguez, Rebeca & Porzycki, Marek & Vetrák, Milan, 2010. "The role of national central banks in banking supervision in selected central and eastern European countries," Legal Working Paper Series 11, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecblwp:201011
    Note: 1459901
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Luna Martinez, Jose & Rose, Thomas A., 2003. "International survey of integrated financial sector supervision," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3096, The World Bank.
    2. Taylor, Michael & Fleming, Alex, 1999. "Integrated financial supervision : lessons of Northern European experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2223, The World Bank.
    3. Donato Masciandaro (ed.), 2005. "Handbook of Central Banking and Financial Authorities in Europe," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3387.
    4. Petrovic, Ana & Tutsch, Ralf, 2009. "National rescue measures in response to the current financial crisis," Legal Working Paper Series 8, European Central Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2017. "Twin Peaks And Central Banks: Economics, Political Economy And Comparative Analysis," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1768, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    3. Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2015. "Coordination of banking regulation in the EU," MPRA Paper 66073, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    5. Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
    6. Masciandaro Donato, 2012. "Back to the Future?: Central Banks as Prudential Supervisors in the Aftermath of the Crisis," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 112-130, July.
    7. Freddy H. Castro & Ingrid Monroy, 2011. "Demanda laboral en la Banca Central: análisis de tendencias 2000-2009," Borradores de Economia 662, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    8. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    9. L. Dalla Pellegrina & D. Masciandaro & R. Pansini, 2014. "Do exchange rate regimes affect the role of central banks as banking supervisors?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 279-315, October.

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