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Democracy, Epistocracy and Hybrid decision-making: Information specificity and costs of political governance

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  • Alexandre Chirat
  • Cyril Hédoin

Abstract

This paper contributes to the Democracy versus Epistocracy debate (Brennan and Landemore 2022) by providing a theoretical framework and a criterion to choose between democratic, hybrid and epistocratic modes of political governance. From a normative perspective, we claim that the specificity of information should (at least partially) guide the choice between these modes of political governance because of its impact on costs of political governance. The main logic of the model is the following: an issue has a degree of information specificity that determines costs of political governance combined in a Social Costs Function. Therefore, the model helps to assess the relative efficiency between democratic, hybrid and epistocratic decision-making procedures to reach collective choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Chirat & Cyril Hédoin, 2024. "Democracy, Epistocracy and Hybrid decision-making: Information specificity and costs of political governance," EconomiX Working Papers 2024-25, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-25
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy – Epistocracy – Social Choice – Information – Social Costs Function;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance

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