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On the allocation of talented people in developing countries: the role of oil rents

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  • Christian Ebeke
  • Luc Désiré Omgba
  • Rachid Laajaj

Abstract

Evidence has shown that the allocation of talented people affects the long-term growth. It has been found that a large population of engineers tends to foster innovation and growth more rapidly than population of lawyers and other activities with access to the public rent. Yet little is known about what determines the allocation of talents. This paper uses a sample of 69 developing countries to address this question. It shows that the oil rent tends to orient talents towards productive activities in well-governed countries, and towards rentseeking activities in poorly governed countries. These results are robust to different specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods. The paper sheds light on the sources and mechanisms of the resource curse through its effect on human resources and rent-seeking activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ebeke & Luc Désiré Omgba & Rachid Laajaj, 2012. "On the allocation of talented people in developing countries: the role of oil rents," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-26, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2012-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Omgba, Luc Désiré, 2015. "Why Do Some Oil-Producing Countries Succeed in Democracy While Others Fail?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 180-189.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent-seeking; occupational choice; oil rents.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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