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Accidents, Liability Obligations and Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts: Profits and Social Welfare

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  • Pio Baake

Abstract

We analyze the effects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for consumers. Furthermore, while the manufacturers invest more in order to offer cars with higher qualities, monopolization tends to reduce social welfare. Key for these results is the observation that high prices for spare parts entail a negative external effect inasmuch as liability obligations imply that consumers of competing products have to pay the high prices as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Pio Baake, 2008. "Accidents, Liability Obligations and Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts: Profits and Social Welfare," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 782, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp782
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 54-91, April.
    2. Emch Eric R., 2003. "Price Discrimination via Proprietary Aftermarkets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, April.
    3. Schwartz, M. & Werden, G.J., 1995. "A Quality-Signaling Rationale for Aftermarket Tying," Papers 95-01, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    aftermarkets; monopolization; liability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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