Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust
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- Chen, Yongmin, 2011. "Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust," MPRA Paper 31974, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jacob Seifert, 2015. "Welfare effects of compulsory licensing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 317-350, December.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
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