Managerial Incentives, Innovation and Product Market Competition
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More about this item
Keywords
Strategic Delegation; Managerial Incentives; R&D competition and R&D collusion.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAB-2002-08-19 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-TID-2002-08-19 (Technology and Industrial Dynamics)
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