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The Bank Capital Debate: Should Fragility Be Reduced?

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  • Philipp König
  • David Pothier

Abstract

The recent financial crisis has exposed the fragility of the banking sector to sudden withdrawals of wholesale funding, asset price declines and market dry-ups. Governments and central banks had to step in to prevent major banks from defaulting. These events led to renewed interest in the question whether the fragility of banks should be tolerated as a necessary, even desirable feature of an efficient process of financial intermediation, or whether banks should be subject to stricter regulation ex ante. This Round-Up summarizes the key arguments on both sides of the debate.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp König & David Pothier, 2014. "The Bank Capital Debate: Should Fragility Be Reduced?," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 17, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwrup:17en
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    File URL: https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.462096.de/DIW_Roundup_17_en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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    Cited by:

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    2. von der Becke Susanne & Sornette Didier, 2019. "An Asset-Based Framework of Credit Creation (applied to the Global Financial Crisis)," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-21, July.

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