IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwm/wpaper/43.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives

Author

Listed:
  • Donald E. Campbell

    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

Abstract

For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:43
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp43.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, October.
    2. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    3. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
    4. Rader, Trout, 1972. "Theory of Microeconomics," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780125750509.
    5. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2007. "Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 83-104, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, 2004. "State Lottery Revenue: The Importance of Game Characteristics," Public Finance Review, , vol. 32(3), pages 313-330, May.
    4. Giovanni Trovato & Marco Alfó, 2006. "Credit rationing and the financial structure of Italian small and medium enterprises," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 9, pages 167-184, May.
    5. Gabriella Montinola & Ramon Moreno, 2001. "The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 2001-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    6. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
    7. Aleksandras KRYLOVAS & Natalja KOSAREVA & Edmundas Kazimieras ZAVADSKAS, 2016. "Statistical Analysis of KEMIRA Type Weights Balancing Methods," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 19-39, September.
    8. Marc Fleurbaey, 2000. "Choix social : une difficulté et de multiples possibilités," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(5), pages 1215-1232.
    9. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    10. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar & Shahid Adil, 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 689-702.
    11. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, "undated". "Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?," IEW - Working Papers 107, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    12. Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2002. "Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda," NBER Working Papers 8720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Growiec, Jakub, 2018. "Factor-specific technology choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1-14.
    14. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Arrow’s decisive coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 463-505, March.
    15. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
    16. Manfred Holler & Peter Skott, 2005. "Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 215-228, July.
    17. Juan Candeal, 2013. "Invariance axioms for preferences: applications to social choice theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 453-471, September.
    18. Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2004. "Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in Heterogeneous Country," EERC Working Paper Series 01-219e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    19. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
    20. D.P. Doessel & Abbas Valadkhani, 2002. "Public Finance and The Size of Government: A Literature Review and Econometric Results for Fiji," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 108, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto; anonymity; neutrality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Daifeng He or Alfredo Pereira (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/decwmus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.