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STRIDE: A Tool-Assisted LLM Agent Framework for Strategic and Interactive Decision-Making

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Listed:
  • Chuanhao Li

    (Yale University)

  • Runhan Yang

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

  • Tiankai Li

    (University of Science and Technology of China)

  • Milad Bafarassat

    (Sabanci University)

  • Kourosh Sharifi

    (Sabanci University)

  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

  • Zhuoran Yang

    (Yale University)

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 have revolutionized natural language processing, showing remarkable linguistic proficiency and reasoning capabilities. However, their application in strategic multi-agent decision-making environments is hampered by significant limitations including poor mathematical reasoning, difficulty in following instructions, and a tendency to generate incorrect information. These deficiencies hinder their performance in strategic and interactive tasks that demand adherence to nuanced game rules, long-term planning, exploration in unknown environments, and anticipation of opponentsÕ moves. To overcome these obstacles, this paper presents a novel LLM agent framework equipped with memory and specialized tools to enhance their strategic decision-making capabilities. We deploy the tools in a number of economically important environments, in particular bilateral bargaining and multi-agent and dynamic mechanism design. We employ quantitative metrics to assess the frameworkÕs performance in various strategic decision-making problems. Our findings establish that our enhanced framework significantly improves the strategic decision-making capability of LLMs. While we highlight the inherent limitations of current LLM models, we demonstrate the improvements through targeted enhancements, suggesting a promising direction for future developments in LLM applications for interactive environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Chuanhao Li & Runhan Yang & Tiankai Li & Milad Bafarassat & Kourosh Sharifi & Dirk Bergemann & Zhuoran Yang, 2024. "STRIDE: A Tool-Assisted LLM Agent Framework for Strategic and Interactive Decision-Making," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2393, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2393
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
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    4. Peter C. Cramton, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(4), pages 579-593.
    5. Nunzio Lor`e & Babak Heydari, 2023. "Strategic Behavior of Large Language Models: Game Structure vs. Contextual Framing," Papers 2309.05898, arXiv.org.
    6. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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