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Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Togman, Jeffrey M.

Abstract

The agreement between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1978 is used to illustrate how a fair-division procedure called Adjusted Winner (AW), in which two sides allocate 100 points over the issues that divide them, could have been used to reach a settlement. AW satisfies the properties of envy-freeness (each side is ensured of receiving at least 50 of its points and hence does not envy the other side), equitability (each side receives the same number of points over 50), and efficiency (there is no other settlement better for both players). While the actual agreement at Camp David seems to reflect quite well what AW would have yielded on the six issues that divided the two sides, this agreement probably could have been achieved more expeditiously, and in a less crisis-driven atmosphere, if AW had been used.
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Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1996. "Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?," Working Papers 96-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-04
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    Cited by:

    1. Manurangsi, Pasin & Suksompong, Warut, 2017. "Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 100-108.
    2. Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2022. "Fair cake-cutting in practice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 28-49.
    3. Maria Kyropoulou & Josu'e Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice," Papers 1810.08243, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    4. John Zeleznikow, 2021. "Using Artificial Intelligence to provide Intelligent Dispute Resolution Support," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 789-812, August.
    5. Fedor Sandomirskiy & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing," Papers 1908.01669, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; envy-freeness; fair division; territorial disputes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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