Efficient procurement with quality concerns
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- Lionel Thomas & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2006. "Efficient procurement with quality concerns," Post-Print hal-00448801, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
- Nicolas Fugger & Elena Katok & Achim Wambach, 2016. "Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 518-533, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; procurement; non-contractible quality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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