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Retrait des terres et subsidiarité dans le cadre de la Politique Agricole Commune

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Alain Jayet

    (INRA - Unité d’Economie - Centre de Versailles-Grignon)

  • Gilles ROTILLON

    (THEMA - Université de Paris X Nanterre)

Abstract

Ce papier aborde la question de la subsidiarité dans le cadre de la Politique Agricole Commune. L'instrument privilégié est ici un contrat de gel de terre dont la définition relève soit directement des instances de l'Union Européenne, soit des instances nationales. Dans ce dernier cas, dit de subsidiarité, le budget public associé aux contrats est supporté par les budgets nationaux. Les contrats sont déterminés dans les deux types d'intervention publique, nationale et européenne. Dans le cas d'une politique de subsidiarité, les contrats nationaux sont définis par un équilibre de Nash résultant d'un jeu intra-européen. On ne peut déterminer analytiquement la politique qui domine l'autre en terme de welfare, sauf dans le cas très particulier d'Etats « identiques ». Dans ce cas, la politique commune domine la politique de subsidiarité. Toutefois le cadre théorique élaboré est propice à l'analyse empirique. Pour illustrer cette démarche, une analyse quantitative est proposée pour le secteur du blé tendre dans l'Union Européenne à 12 selon des données de 1994. Elle permet la comparaison des gains pour les producteurs, les consommateurs, et les contribuables des 12 pays dans les 3 situations offertes successivement par l'état de référence, la politique commune de gel de terre et la politique de subsidiarité.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Alain Jayet & Gilles ROTILLON, 2002. "Retrait des terres et subsidiarité dans le cadre de la Politique Agricole Commune," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2002041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2002041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    2. Pierre-Alain Jayet, 2001. "Évaluation de politiques de retrait des terres pour la régulation d'un marché agricole," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 61, pages 119-150.
    3. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
    4. repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:08 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gisser, Micha, 1993. "Price Support, Acreage Controls, and Efficient Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 584-611, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Sauveur Ay, 2015. "Information sur l’hétérogénéité de la terre et délégation de la régulation foncière," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 125(3), pages 453-474.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Théorie des contrats; gel de terres; asymétries d’information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy

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