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Information transmission in the absence of commitment

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  • Maravall Rodríguez, Carlos

Abstract

I consider an election with candidate entry and a state variable that affects all players' utility, as it translates their ideal points. Candidates are informed of the realization of the state, whilst voters are not. I study the effect of candidates' commitment on equilibria. I show that if they cannot commit, their private information is of no consequence for the election (i.e. even in a decisiontheoretic sense). Instead, when they can commit this is a standard signaling game.

Suggested Citation

  • Maravall Rodríguez, Carlos, 2005. "Information transmission in the absence of commitment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we053018, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we053018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
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    6. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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