Player splitting in estensive forms games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen & Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, 2000. "Player splitting in extensive form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 433-450.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jean-François Mertens, 2004.
"Ordinality in non cooperative games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 387-430, June.
- Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1987028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 2003. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1738, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean-François Mertens, 1989.
"Stable Equilibria---A Reformulation,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 575-625, November.
- Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
- KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1986. "On the strategic stability of equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004.
"A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francesco De Sinopoli, 2003. "A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy," CEIS Research Paper 21, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016.
"Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 78-109.
- Elnaz Bajoori & Janos Flesch & Dries Vermeulen, 2013. "Behavioral Perfect Equilibrium in Bayesian Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 16/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003.
"From evolutionary to strategic stability,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
- DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008.
"Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs,"
Research Papers
2000, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Justification of Stable Equilibria," Research Papers 1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- John Hillas & Mathijs Jansen & Jos Potters & Dries Vermeulen, 2001. "On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(3), pages 611-635, August.
- Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2013.
"Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 490-502.
- Bajoori, E. & Flesch, J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2011. "Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces," Research Memorandum 029, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008.
"Metastable Equilibria,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 787-820, November.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Metastable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001211, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Metastable Equilibria," Research Papers 1934r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021.
"Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
- Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Lucas Pahl, 2022. "Polytope-form games and Index/Degree Theories for Extensive-form games," Papers 2201.02098, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018. "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 275-293.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Jansen, Mathijs & Vermeulen, Dries, 2001. "Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 111-130, January.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014.
"Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 469-474, May.
- Eduardo Perez, 2015. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps," Post-Print hal-03392982, HAL.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009.
"On Forward Induction,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, January.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001859, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "'On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000825, David K. Levine.
More about this item
Keywords
Invariance;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:6150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.