IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/werepe/3901.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion

Author

Listed:
  • Estrada, Javier

Abstract

I analyze in this paper the impact of insider trading regulation (ITR) on a securities market and on social welfare. I argue below that the imposition of ITR forces a reallocation of wealth and risk that decreases social welfare. Three reasons explain this resulto First, ITR increases the volatility of securities prices, thus making the market more risky; second, it worsens the risk sharing among investors; and, third, it diverts resources from the productive sector of the economy. Further, although I formally establish conditions under which ITR makes society better off, largue that those conditions cannot be used to justify the imposition of this regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3901, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:3901
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams/3b5e9fef-b21f-4425-aafe-598a2dd1ceb6/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:aei:rpbook:53302 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 70-93, February.
    3. Cornell, Bradford & Sirri, Erik R, 1992. "The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1031-1059, July.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    5. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Spiegel, Matthew, 1991. "Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 255-282.
    6. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1022-1041, December.
    7. Jagannathan, Ravi & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1989. "Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity and Future Prices," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(3), pages 411-430, July.
    8. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1991. "Risk Aversion, Market Liquidity, and Price Efficiency," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(3), pages 416-441.
    9. Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-1430, November.
    10. Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry, 1989. "Information and Equilibrium with Inside Traders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(395), pages 152-167, Supplemen.
    11. Estrada, Javier, 1994. "Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk neutrality," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2922, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    12. Spiegel, Matthew & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive Securities Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 307-329.
    13. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    14. Haddock, David D & Macey, Jonathan R, 1987. "Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 311-352, October.
    15. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 106-122, Spring.
    16. Michael Manove, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 823-845.
    17. Mark S. Grinblatt & Stephen A. Ross, 1985. "Market Power in a Securities Market with Endogenous Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1143-1167.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Empirical evidence on the impact of European insider trading regulations," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 7068, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Estrada, Javier, 1994. "Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk neutrality," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2922, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Insider trading: Regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 421-449.
    3. Liu, Jun & Peleg, Ehud & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 2004. "The Value of Private Information," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt71t9z3w3, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    4. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.
    5. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
    6. Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Insider trading: regulation, risk reallocation, and welfare," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3900, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Chen, Zhihong & Huang, Yuan & Kusnadi, Yuanto & John Wei, K.C., 2017. "The real effect of the initial enforcement of insider trading laws," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 687-709.
    8. Ledenyov, Dimitri O. & Ledenyov, Viktor O., 2015. "Wave function method to forecast foreign currencies exchange rates at ultra high frequency electronic trading in foreign currencies exchange markets," MPRA Paper 67470, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Agastya, Murali, 2003. "Insider Trading, Informational Effciency and Allocative Effciency," Working Papers 6, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    10. Millicent Chang & Xiaolin Qian & Jing Yu & Yvonne See, 2017. "Does director trading change the information environment?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 42(2), pages 205-229, May.
    11. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
    12. Maug, Ernst, 2002. "Insider trading legislation and corporate governance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1569-1597, October.
    13. Pierce, Andrew T., 2024. "Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
    14. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    15. Tong, Wilson H.S. & Zhang, Shaojun & Zhu, Yanjian, 2013. "Trading on inside information: Evidence from the share-structure reform in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1422-1436.
    16. Gabriel Desgranges & Celine Rochon, 2008. "Conformism, Public News and Market Effciency," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe16, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    17. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, 1990. "The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects," Discussion Papers 897, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Huan Liu & Weiqi Liu & Yi Li, 2022. "Private Information Dissemination and Noise Trading: Implications for Price Efficiency and Market Liquidity," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-19, September.
    19. Skaife, Hollis A. & Veenman, David & Wangerin, Daniel, 2013. "Internal control over financial reporting and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 91-110.
    20. Biais, Bruno & Foucault, Thierry, 1993. "Asymétrie d’information et marchés financiers : une synthèse de la littérature récente," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 69(1), pages 8-44, mars.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider trading;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:3901. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ana Poveda (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.