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Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation

Author

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  • Haddock, David D
  • Macey, Jonathan R

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Haddock, David D & Macey, Jonathan R, 1987. "Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 311-352, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:30:y:1987:i:2:p:311-52
    DOI: 10.1086/467139
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter-Jan Engelen & Luc Liedekerke, 2007. "The Ethics of Insider Trading Revisited," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 497-507, September.
    2. Wielhouwer, Jacco L., 2013. "When is public enforcement of insider trading regulations effective?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-60.
    3. P. J. Engelen & L. Liedekerke, 2006. "An Ethical Analysis of Regulating Insider Trading," Working Papers 06-05, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Charness, Gary B & Garoupa, Nuno, 1998. "Reputation And Honesty In A Market For Information," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5fh8v64g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    5. Del Brio, Esther B. & Miguel, Alberto & Perote, Javier, 2002. "An investigation of insider trading profits in the Spanish stock market," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 73-94.
    6. Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 2001. "Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave (1897-1903)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1329-1349, December.
    7. Miles Kellerman, 2021. "Market structure and disempowering regulatory intermediaries: Insights from U.S. trade surveillance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1350-1369, October.
    8. Taylor Smith & Walter E. Block, 2016. "The Economics of Insider Trading: A Free Market Perspective," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 47-53, November.
    9. Vahe Lskavyan, 2015. "Insider regulation and the incentive to invest as an insider," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 207-227, August.
    10. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a Hostile World: the institutionalization of the field in the United States from the immediate post-war period to the Reagan years," Working Papers halshs-03124774, HAL.
    11. Jeffry M. Netter & Annette B. Poulsen & Philip L. Hersch, 1988. "Insider Trading: The Law, The Theory, The Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(3), pages 1-13, July.
    12. Harold Mulherin, J., 2007. "Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 421-437, June.
    13. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F., 1995. "Does Section 16b deter insider trading by target managers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 295-319.
    14. David Howden, 2014. "Knowledge flows and insider trading," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 45-55, March.
    15. Darren T. Roulstone, 2003. "The Relation Between Insider‐Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 525-551, June.
    16. Philip Hamill & Philip McIlkenny & Kwaku Opong, 2002. "Directors' Share Dealings and Company Financial Performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 6(3), pages 215-234, September.
    17. Will, Matthias Georg & Pies, Ingo, 2014. "Insiderhandel und die Regulierung der Kapitalmärkte: Ein Beitrag zur MiFID-Debatte," Discussion Papers 2014-7, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    18. Will Matthias Georg & Pies Ingo, 2014. "Insiderhandel und die Neuordnung der Kapitalmärkte: Ein Beitrag zur Regulierungsdebatte in Europa / Insider Trade and the New Ordering of Capital Markets: A Contribution to the Regulatory Debate in Eu," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 159-182, January.
    19. Gilbert, Aaron & Tourani-Rad, Alireza & Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr, 2006. "Do insiders crowd out analysts?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 40-48, March.
    20. Maug, Ernst, 2002. "Insider trading legislation and corporate governance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1569-1597, October.
    21. Szockyj, Elizabeth & Geis, Gilbert, 2002. "Insider trading: Patterns and analysis," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 273-286.
    22. Wisniewski, Tomasz P., 2004. "Reexamination of the link between insider trading and price efficiency," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 209-228, June.
    23. Enrico Colombatto & Valerio Tavormina, 2018. "Regulating information flows: Is it just? Insider trading and mandatory-disclosure rules from a free-market perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 205-221, October.
    24. repec:hal:journl:hal-04692482 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3901, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

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