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Identity and Incentives an Economic Interpretation of the Holocaust

Author

Listed:
  • Raul Caruso

    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

Abstract

This paper proposes an interpretation of the Holocaust along the lines of economic theory and public choice. The Holocaust had been the most inhumane and brutal genocide in the twentieth century, and also a gigantic predatory enterprise shaped and engineered by a complex institutional machinery. The paper proposes a general interpretation based on the inclusion of identity-associated elements in the utility functions of Nazis. Under the Nazi regime, the production and strengthening of Nazi identity was a matter of political economy. In addition, interpretations of Aryanization (appropriation of Jewish property) and the running of extermination camps are provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Caruso, 2015. "Identity and Incentives an Economic Interpretation of the Holocaust," DISCE - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0072, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie5:ispe0072
    as

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    File URL: http://istituti.unicatt.it/politica-economica-ISPE0072.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles Anderton, 2014. "A research agenda for the economic study of genocide: signposts from the field of conflict economics," Working Papers 1413, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    2. Raul Caruso, 2012. "Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 257-278.
    3. Buchheim, Christoph & Scherner, Jonas, 2006. "The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 390-416, June.
    4. John R. Hamman & George Loewenstein & Roberto A. Weber, 2010. "Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1826-1846, September.
    5. Franklin G. Mixon & Ernest W. King, 2009. "Coercion, vertical trust and entrepreneurism in bureaucracies: evidence from the Nazi Holocaust," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 673-679.
    6. Franklin Mixon & W. Charles Sawyer & Len Treviño, 2004. "Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 371-381, November.
    7. Banken, Ralf, 2006. "National Socialist Plundering of Precious Metals, 1933-1945: The Role of Degussa," Institute of European Studies, Working Paper Series qt5615g5pm, Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley.
    8. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    9. Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Holocaust; identity; expropriation; dehumanization; Aryanization; extermination camps; genocide;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H13 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Economics of Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Nationalization

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