Insular decision-making in the board room: why boards retain and hire sub-standard ceos
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Cited by:
- Meg Sato, 2010. "Board's Monitoring and Retention of Sub-standard and Powerless CEOs," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-711, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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