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What’s love got to do with it ? An experimental test of household models in East Uganda

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Listed:
  • Vegard Iversen
  • Cecile Jackson
  • Bereket Kebede
  • Alistair Munro
  • Arjan Verschoor

Abstract

We test core theories of the household using variants of a public good game and experimental data from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses do not maximise surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge. This violates assumptions of unitary and cooperative models. When women control the common account, they receive less than when men control it; this contradicts standard bargaining models. Women contribute less than men and are rewarded more generously by men than vice versa. This casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990). While the absence of altruism is rejected, we find evidence for opportunism. The results are put in a socioeconomic context using quantitative and qualitative survey data. Assortative matching and correlates of bargaining power influence behaviour within the experiments. Our findings suggest that a "one-size fits all" model of the household is unlikely to be satisfactory.

Suggested Citation

  • Vegard Iversen & Cecile Jackson & Bereket Kebede & Alistair Munro & Arjan Verschoor, 2006. "What’s love got to do with it ? An experimental test of household models in East Uganda," CSAE Working Paper Series 2006-01, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    • Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2006-01
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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