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The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier GOSSNER

    (CNRS CREST, Institut Polytechnique de Paris and Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics)

  • Jean-François MERTENS

    (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain.)

Abstract

We study the description and value of information in zero-sum games. We define a series of informational relations between information schemes, and show that informational equivalence classes are captured by canonical information structures. Moreover, two information schemes induce the same value in every game if and only if they are informationally equivalent.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier GOSSNER & Jean-François MERTENS, 2020. "The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games," Working Papers 2020-19, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2020-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
    2. , & , & ,, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
    3. Gensbittel, Fabien & Renault, Jérôme & Peski, Marcin, 2019. "The large space of information structures," TSE Working Papers 19-1006, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 2013. "Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 917-966.
    7. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gensbittel, Fabien & Pęski, Marcin & Renault, Jérôme, 2022. "Value-based distance between information structures," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    2. Fabien Gensbittel & Marcin Peski & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Value-Based Distance Between Information Structures," Working Papers hal-01869139, HAL.

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