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European Unification Based on Flexibility and Diversity

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

European unification has a noble aim but is endangered by encompassing egalitarianism and bureaucratization, and is moreover subject to a major democracy deficit. This paper argues that flexible and dynamic entities whose territoriality is determined by issues are appropriate for a Europe of the 21st century. The first step must be to constitutionally allow the emergence and existence of corresponding political entities with taxing and spending power. Over time these flexible, democratic, and diverse political units will take over those activities national states and the EU do not fulfill well.
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  • Bruno S. Frey, 2015. "European Unification Based on Flexibility and Diversity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2015-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2015-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schneider Friedrich, 1992. "The Federal And Fiscal Structures Of Representative And Direct Democracies As Models For A European Federal Union: Some Ideas Using The Public-Choice Approach," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 403-438, December.
    2. Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P4 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General

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